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In recent years security has become a fundamental topic in relations between
Mexico and the United States. For both countries, it occupies a vital place on their
own domestic agendas, and on the bilateral agenda as well. Due to geographic
determinism and a circle of common economic interests —and despite political
variations in the state of affairs at any given moment and notwithstanding some
wounded sensibilities— they share a common problem unparalleled in history.
Beyond some confusion and what appeared in the media, Mexico’s position fol-
lowing the September 2001 terrorist attacks was one of full support. It is true that
there was some wavering on the part of some members of the cabinet in the days
after the attacks, and a certain mean-spiritedness on the part of some political par-
ties. Equally true is that these blunders have been well-documented in a kind of
combination “book-reproach” written by Jeffrey Davidow when he was U.S. ambas-
sador in Mexico. From the very first pages, his annoyance at Mexico’s lack of con-
sideration is evident:
The initial reaction by the Mexican people and government was, as expected, one of
horror.... However, the reaction rapidly became confused, and degenerated into an
unseemly political debate that revealed a great deal of imprudence and insensitivity.1
Beyond this clumsy reaction, Mexico carried out all the necessary changes in its
security strategy and risks agenda to cooperate in a resolute, visible way to impro-
ve security levels.
However, Washington’s reaction to Mexico and other countries has not contribut-
ed much to creating a better atmosphere. The premonitions expressed by many
observers after hearing President Bush’s initial speeches after the attacks were not
very encouraging and leaned toward the United States opting for a fundamentally uni-
lateral, self-absorbed policy, and adopting a paradigm that, as Luis Ernesto Derbez has
put it very well, consists of obtaining security “against everyone and despite everyone.”2
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This has had tangible consequences. Influential political analyst Fareed Zakaria
attests to the increasing incomprehension in other countries of the way in which
Washington has handled its foreign policy since 2001. In countries as disparate as
France and Indonesia, anti-U.S. sentiment has increased to its highest levels in the
last 50 years.3 It is probably not that high in other countries, but there is growing mis-
trust, and this is not a spontaneous occurrence.
The initial security strategies designed by the Bush administration were developed
as if its surroundings were totally hostile, fraught with danger and threats. Inspections
and control of passengers and cargo containers were initiated without regard to the
fact that the United States is flanked by two friendly countries, allies and trade part-
ners, specifically Mexico and Canada.
It is important to emphasize here that there are two components in U.S. security
strategy: at the bilateral level, which is the most important for the two countries, the
issue is dominated by the guidelines of the National Strategy for Homeland Security,4
and on a broader level, the controversial doctrine of preemptive action has gained
ground.5 For most of the world’s countries, these two elements of U.S. strategy can
be conceived of as one and the same. However, for Mexico, it is vital to distinguish
between them, since the disagreements generated by U.S. international actions do
not necessarily affect the crucial agreements for defending the NorthAmerican secu-
rity perimeter.6
Mexico has cooperated without fail in maintaining the North American secu-
rity perimeter.7 Meetings between the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security and
Mexico’s Interior Ministers have been frequent, and communication is guaran-
teed through special channels maintained between the two government officials.
In addition, Mexico reinforced its border controls, especially in relation to the
so-called restricted nationalities and has accepted and supported the concept of
intelligent borders. Mexico has implemented all the controls imposed by U.S.
authorities on its civil aviation, as if they were part of its own program. Operation
Centinela was implemented in response to the war in Iraq, mobilizing security
forces several thousand strong.8 Another facet of this cooperation is the partici-
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pation in exercises simulating a terrorist attack, such as those conducted in
November 2003 along the Sonora-Arizona border. At the bilateral level, coopera-
tion is fluid, with no strings attached. Since the 2005 Waco summit, the Security
and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) has been the new trilateral framework for bol-
stering the security agenda and striking a balance with the prosperity agenda.
However, there have been important discrepancies in the multilateral context,
especially in how to deal with Iraq. During Mexico’s participation in the United
Nations Security Council (2001-2003), it took positions supporting the inspections
headed by Hans Blix,9 and this autonomy led to some friction with the hegemonic
power, without, however, placing bilateral cooperation in jeopardy—which is, in the
end, the most important for Washington and for Mexico.10 In addition to this, Mex-
ico is clearly off the map in terms of the fundamentalisms that encourage terrorism.
This comparative advantage has not, in our opinion, been adequately considered.
In short, the U.S. reaction —although initially understandable— offended a
good number of its allies in numerous ways, and this is especially true in the case
of a partner like Mexico, since it knocked Mexican affairs down to last place on
its list of priorities.11 Issues of great importance, such as the agenda for deepening
bilateral relations between the two countries, and consolidating North America as
a region, vanished from the scene in 2001. The so called “NAFTA Plus” has experi-
enced practically the same fate,12 although recently, more importance has been
placed on economic issues, and a more serious focus has been given to the com-
petitiveness of the North American region (United States, Canada and Mexico)
through the SSP with respect to other regions of the world.
The long-aspired-to migration agreement for regularizing the situation for thou-
sands of undocumented Mexicans working in the United States (proposed at the
beginning of the Fox administration) was brushed aside, relegated to the lowest of
U.S. priorities for nearly two years.
The issues that are fundamental for Mexico in a context dominated by the need
to redefine its relations with its neighbor to the north in a more constructive and
comprehensive way were literally placed on the back burner.
The Forgotten Agenda and Its Consequences
The progress made in Mexico since the year 2000 in terms of democratization,
respect for human rights, top-level cooperation in the fight against drug traffick-
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ing and the determination to deepen relations with the United States has not been
matched with concrete proposals. This lack of response from Washington has
implied political costs for Mexico’s first non-Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
administration.
What is true is that not all of the above can be attributed to U.S. disinterest inMex-
ican affairs. The misunderstandings and mistakes made by the Fox administration in
the way it handled the proposal for a migration agreement have damaged the Mex-
ican government’s credibility in the eyes of the public. Fox was mistaken in his initial
proposal, when he assumed that a splendid personal relationship between the two
presidents would be enough to provide the needed push for such an important instru-
ment. Reality has demonstrated the contrary.
The “old”Mexican nationalists regrouped into the PRI and Party of the Democratic
Revolution (PRD) attacked Fox for his “naïveté” in trusting the Bush administration,
reaffirming their long-held positions and prejudices with regard to the United States.
The notion of being considered the “back yard” of the world’s foremost power has
been reinforced in the perceptions of broad sectors of the population.
The consequences of this situation are clearly negative forMexico. The traditional
political class is reinforcing its anti-U.S. prejudices, which had gradually been disap-
pearing in the previous years with the advancement of trade integration.
The alleged initial spirit of the two administrations for seeking greater understand-
ing and cooperation remained nothing more than good intentions. A large number of
U.S. opinion-makers in the mass media and a considerable number of decision mak-
ers have not been able to understand that friendly cooperation was crucial for recog-
nizing Mexico as a real partner with whom it wishes to deepen relations. A gesture
of friendship and trust from its neighbor to the north would have been useful for the
Mexican government, with the aim of preventing cooperation from being interpret-
ed by revolutionary nationalists as a sign of surrender, and also, for expanding that
cooperation to other spheres. A fence along the common border as a way to deal with
security and migration issues is not precisely a constructive agenda.
Integration Comes to a Halt
By 2006, the development of North America as an economic region and trade
area marked by internal coherence had not advanced beyond the levels charac-
terizing the previous decade. The George W. Bush administration enjoyed boast-
ing of its privileged relationship with Mexico. At the closing ceremony of the
2002 Monterrey summit, Bush said that between Mexico and the United States,
there was “a historic partnership, one which will benefit both our peoples and
provide a good example for the rest of the world.”13 How can such a statement
be interpreted?
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While other regions of the world, like Europe, have developed an emerging supra-
national identity, while preserving their national particularities, North America has
not moved beyond the free trade level,14 and since 2001, the gap betweenMexico and
theUnited States has grown. Far fromdevelopingmore trust between the two countries,
our main successes can be described at two levels:
1) The first is that despite the obsession around security, we find that econom-
ic and human flows have been maintained, although hindered and marked
by more mistrust.
2) The second is that we have cooperated in a satisfactory way, not in building
bridges and liaisons for enhancing the prosperity of both countries, but in build-
ing borders, controls and even fences.
To the contrary, European countries have consistently worked together to deal with
security issues. The group of countries in what is known as the Schengen area has
suppressed internal border controls and created a European office for addressing ter-
rorism-related matters. They are working at a more comprehensive level to develop a
common security arrangement.15 But let us return to North America.
At a tactical-operational level, we should point out that despite the errors in the
way Mexico initially addressed the problem, and despite the nationalist reactions in
the United States, the two countries have adapted practically to security arrangements
for North America. Tom Ridge, the former Secretary of Homeland Security, put it
this way in 2004:
Each of us has a homeland to protect. An attack on one affects the security and
economy of the other… the mission of guaranteeing our liberties and protecting our
citizens against terrorists and other offenders who harm and take advantage of inno-
cent people. We share a clear vision of prosperity and security, of democracy and open
markets. We understand exactly what is at stake. Mexico is a strong partner in the war
against terrorism.16
We clearly share the same objectives. However, when it comes to the methods
used for dealing with problems, the two countries’ perceptions begin to diverge.
For the U.S. government, everything is potentially a risk and therefore must be given
priority attention. Once again, let us look at comments made by Tom Ridge:
Our historic confidence in the protection offered to us by two vast oceans and two
good neighbors will no longer be adequate against an enemy that turns airplanes into
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missiles and cargo containers into transportation for weapons. The same communi-
cation and transportation systems used to expand prosperity throughout the world
and lift people out of poverty are now used by terrorist networks to spread fear and
harvest destruction.17
Within this logic of universalizing risk, the everyday lives of the economic
actors who base their prosperity on free trade are directly affected. The long waits
for trucks at the borders and all the necessary certification processes for entering
the U.S. market constitute a type of neo-protectionist barrier. Agricultural exporters
and livestock producers have witnessed how regulations and controls have multi-
plied, in line with the bioterrorist legislation that came into effect at the end of
2003. The United States has not managed to —nor has it wanted to—propose its
security agenda as a matter of mutual interest, through which what Colin Powell
once called a “zone of confidence”18 could emerge. Rather, a lack of trust has been
the dominant tone.
The Mexican-U.S. border is a dynamic border with an intensity that cannot be
easily compared to any other in the world. Along its 3000 kilometers, there are
400 million border crossings each year, of which nearly 253 million are pedestri-
an crossings. It has been calculated that 98 percent of bilateral trade—which reached
a level of US$400 billion in 2006— takes place across that border. According to
reports from the Colegio de la Frontera Norte (the Northern Border College), Tom
Ridge’s aspiration of balancing security with free trade and agility in the transit of
individuals who legitimately enter the United States is merely a laudable inten-
tion since, in the words of the president of the Northern Border College, Jorge
Santibáñez, U.S. security policy “has put the management of international immigra-
tion in the same category as the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking and weapons
trafficking.”19
Things could certainly be worse. It is true that efforts have been made to improve
and facilitate border crossings. Between the two countries, it has been possible to con-
jure up a scenario of the impregnable fortress, and despite restrictions and stepped-
up security measures, “a dynamic has been achieved that makes the U.S. obsession
with security now compatible with trade flows and the transit of citizens who have legit-
imate reasons for visiting the United States.”20
U.S. andMexican authorities concur on the need to invest considerable resources
to prevent the border from becoming an obstacle to legitimate activities. However,
little progress has been made to date toward this objective. Mexicans continue to be
eligible for a visa that may be granted only after extensive data has been collected.
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Mexico was one of the first countries to be included in the U.S. Visit program, but
entrance procedures into the United States can be long and annoying.
Beyond investment in technology to better control the entry of citizens and mer-
chandise, Mexico’s proposal for simultaneously moving forward with both the migra-
tion and security agendas was very logical and even provocative. The link between
the two agendas was put in this way:
U.S. national security strategy would be strengthened by identifying the population
currently living within its borders in legal limbo —meaning that this population is vul-
nerable to abuses and hindered from openly joining efforts by the responsible author-
ities to enforce the law. This is not simply a matter of recognizing their rights, but also
making them fully responsible for fulfilling their civic obligations.21
Mexico’s attempt to make the migration issue coincide with the increase in secu-
rity levels has not been successful, nor will it succeed in the immediate future. There
are a variety of reasons, but especially evident is the fact that despite all we share and
all that sets us apart, our region has not managed to clearly identify the circle of issues
within which cooperation would provide better results for implementing sovereign
policies. For Mexicans, illegal immigration opens up a situation marked by abuse,
and for the U.S., it demonstrates that its control over the population is highly vul-
nerable and probably susceptible to corruption, since it is impossible to explain how
more than 6 million individuals neither have legal immigration status nor are in the
process of acquiring it.
The United States finds itself facing an undeniable fact: its citizens coexist with
millions of individuals who have violated its immigration laws for purely economic
reasons. Ignoring the issue or attempting to address it unilaterally, without acknowl-
edging the economic component, only leads to a reduced perception of security, since
the world’s greatest power has been shown to be incapable of controlling the problem
through legal channels.
North America: A Tribute to Differences
The North American community should make efforts to acknowledge its circle of
common interests, which include many more than those on either side of the bor-
der initially want to recognize. The SPP is probably the first step in the right direc-
tion because it is a highly controversial attempt to reach a balance in the region’s
security concerns and prosperity priorities.
The objective of shared security is a magnificent opportunity for working togeth-
er, if we can surpass restrictive visions and complexes, since, as JorgeMontaño has said,
we can stop being anything but neighbors. Geographic determinism forces us to jointly
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address security matters.22 If terrorism is the main issue on the agenda, Mexico is an
invaluable ally and an ideal neighbor.
As already stated here, Mexico is not a country that encourages terrorism in any
way. We are a country that receives very few immigrants from the countries consid-
ered to be potentially dangerous. Furthermore, despite the fears of some nativists,
Mexico shares with its neighbor the values of individual freedom, the market econ-
omy and the entire symbolic model represented by the United States.
In 1993, Samuel Huntington published an essay that sparked an enormous contro-
versy regarding the ways in which conflicts will take shape on the international scene
after the decline of ideologies. He suggested that cultural factors will constitute the
main driving force of conflict. Even the title of his article was revealing: “The Clash of
Civilizations?”23 In his text, he defined a set of elements characterizing Western civ-
ilization, and in contrast to Naipaul, he established that the West was not the univer-
sal civilization, and that only a group of countries sharing certain characteristics fully
belonged to Western civilization. He stated that there is little resonance for ideas of
individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, the rule of law,
democracy, free markets and the separation of church and state in Islamic, Confucian,
Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist and Orthodox civilizations.24
There is no doubt that Mexico shares the values mentioned here, in some cases
as something to aspire to, and in others, as a goal achieved after years of debate and
struggle. Mexico is a country that aspires to political modernity in accordance with
Western norms.
Definitively, the Mexican population cannot be considered —socially or cultural-
ly— a threat to U.S. security. On the contrary, the United States finds on its south-
ern border a country that, albeit with resentment and mistrust derived from a stormy
relationship, aspires to live in peace and to create greater prosperity for the region.
What perhaps have not been fully understood in some political, academic and
media circles are the transformations experienced by Mexico in economic, demo-
graphic and political spheres, which should be reflected in a new foreign policy and
crowned with a new relationship with the United States. If the United States con-
siders these changes with greater perspective, it should realize that Mexico cannot
continue to receive the same treatment it received 20 years ago.
Paradigms in Transformation
Mexico was “hooked” into economic globalization with the signing of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993, however other issues such as nation-
al security, foreign policy and Mexico’s role in the world remained largely anchored to
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doctrinaire matrices of the past.25 This is due in part to national inertia, and in part
because the door has not been opened in the United States to the possibility of think-
ing of a more generous integration scheme that is more politically attractive to
the majorities. The debate around the type of relations that should be developed
with the Unit ed States is evolving at coordinates very similar to those of the 1970s.
Strategic debate has been narrowing considerably since 2001. Any topics not
resolved at previous moments have been removed from the discussion. However, if
changes do not appear to be that significant in the area of international politics, the
process of Mexico’s integration into the U.S. economy is a seemingly irreversible
trend. The interdependence between the two economies is astound ing. Let us look
at some data. In the 1990s Mexico became consolidated as one of the world’s export
powers. Its total trade volume in the year 2000 was 2.3 times greater than that of
Russia. Or to compare it with another Latin American economy with a practically
identical gross domestic product (GDP), Mexico’s foreign trade volume is more than
five times greater than that of Brazil.26
In 1993, one year before NAFTA, Mexico’s total exports amounted to nearly US$52
billion. Three years later, the figure had reached nearly US$96 billion,27 and by 2006,
its total exports to the U.S. were just above US$212 billion. 
This process of becoming more connected internationally is accompanied by
increasing integration into the U.S. economy. In 1992, two years before the free trade
agreement with the United States and Canada went into effect, 81 percent of Mex -
ico’s exports were destined for the U.S. market; however by the end of that decade,
the figure had increased to levels slightly above 88 percent, which in practice, is
equivalent to almost complete dependence on the United States. In 2006, of Mex -
ico’s total exports of US$250 billion, approximately US$212 billion was concentrat-
ed in the United States.28
On the other side of the coin, imports are less concentrated. However, the figures
are high, with a tendency to rise. In 1992, 71.2 percent of Mexico’s imports came from
the United States, and in 1999, they increased to 74.2 percent. In 2006, Mex ico impor -
ted from the United States US$131 billion.29 In other words, what Mexico purchas-
es from the United States —which means competitiveness, jobs and well-being for
the U.S.— is greater than the total purchased from the United States by several European
countries, such as Italy, France, Spain and England. Thus, if we measure the relation-
ship of interdependence in terms of bilateral trade, Mexico should not be consider ed
a burden in the region. 
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However, the connection between the two countries can be perceived in other ways
beyond trade figures and consumer patterns. It is also important to consider demo-
graphic dynamics, since they offer clear elements for analysis. In a period of 30 years
(1970-2000), Mexico’s population doubled, and a significant portion migrated to large
cities in Mexico or to the United States. The number of Mexicans living in the Unit -
ed States has increased enormously in recent years.
Today, between 10 and 12 million Mexicans live in the United States, and between
40 and 50 percent of them are undocumented, according to estimates received by the
Pew Hispanic Center and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Migration and trade figures demonstrate that the current degree of integration of
the two countries is enormous, although many prefer to ignore this. “Strategic igno-
rance” is always an option for politicians but Mexico is clearly a country that has been
transnationalized in economic and demographic terms.
North America: A Pipe Dream?
Despite the convincing nature of trade and demographic statistics, as well as the
political will of the Vicente Fox administration to redefine bilateral relations around
new key points,30 the foundations for deepening bilateral relations have not been
established.
Because of this dilemma, many years have been lost to Mexico, which has been
unable to find a meeting point between, on the one hand, its economic and demograph-
ic reality with a focus on the North American region, and on the other, a traditional
foreign policy discourse that continues to be deeply entrenched in the nation’s polit-
ical class.31
It is true that Mexico is highly confused as to its place in the world. The revolu-
tionary nationalism that holds together the PRI and the PRD is anachronistic for one
of the world’s export powers. However, this continues to be the dominant focus of
these two political parties’ discourse, and the generalized opinion is that the United
States does not consider Mexico a real partner. This predominance of nationalism
has an important reactive component, and has methodologically hindered any progress
in reformulating national interests.
In this context, the region is experiencing a period of great ambiguity. Mexico
defines its trade and economic interests separate from and sometimes in opposition
to its foreign policy. And the United States defines it foreign and security policies as
if Mexico were a country with which it has only insignificant exchanges, and as if it
were potentially dangerous.
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Few dare to state clearly that a North American focus is —by geographic, eco-
nomic and demographic definition— of the highest priority for Mexico, and to a sig-
nificant degree, for the United States as well.
Thus, we have an ongoing problem that sparks heated patriotic discussions on both
sides of the border. The rhetoric does not exactly prevent moving forward in the inte-
gration of the North American region; but, it does create mistrust and reinforce prej-
udices. Nor does patriotic propaganda endanger bilateral relations, which are handled
with a great deal of pragmatism. However, what we have is far from an ideal situation.
It is worth asking ourselves seriously and directly whether the United States is
interested in developing a different relationship with Mexico. The very year that
NAFTA was approved, in his article on the clash of civilizations, Samuel Huntington
proposed the concept of “torn countries,” and referred to three cases: Turkey, Russia
and Mexico.
He stated that Mexico is the closest country to the United States, and one that
debates whether it will remain part of Latin America or become part of North
America. At the end of his article, he stated that in order to define to which civiliza-
tion a “torn country” belongs, it must satisfy three requirements. The first is that its
economic and political elites support the transformation. The second is that its peo-
ple are in agreement with the redefinition, and the third is that the dominant groups
in the civilization of destination are willing to receive the new convert. It is impor-
tant to point out that in the text cited here, Huntington indicated that “all three
requirements in large part exist with respect to Mexico.”32
If this was true in 1993, and if structural data for 2007 points toward greater con-
vergence between Mexico and the United States, in the coming years, the two coun-
tries should find a place of collaboration and cooperation on security issues that, in
turn, should generate greater trust. Montaño phrased it well when he wrote, “There
is no way to ignore that we are neighbors, and thus we will never be able to disregard
the importance of our contribution to the security equation. This is our only real play-
ing card for achieving change, and we should use it legitimately and responsibly to
maintain dialogue that is indispensable for Mexico.”33
Being indispensable for the security equation is mutual. Mexico is indispensable
for guaranteeing U.S. security, and U.S. security is indispensable for Mexico. A ter-
rorist attack perpetrated from Mexican territory would be disastrous for bilateral rela-
tions and indeed for the country’s viability. Mexico is convinced —for practical and
ideological reasons— of the importance of cooperating, and consequently it does not
deserve to be treated as if it were a potentially hostile country.
Being indispensable for the security equation implies acknowledging that the secu-
rity of North America guarantees its future economic viability as well, in relation to
major competitors such as the European Union and China. In this respect, Mex ico
comprises a market of more than 105 million inhabitants and is a fundamental actor
in U.S. development, especially for some U.S. states in particular. A prosperous Mexico
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guarantees jobs and prosperity for North Americans, and conceiving of North America
as a coherent economic and trade area offers the United States greater vigor and
strength to compete with the economic and demographic giants in the East (China
and India) and the West (the European Union) throughout the twenty-first century.
Being indispensable for the security equation means acknowledging that Mexican
workers who migrate to the United States play a fundamental role in its competi-
tiveness and demographic revitalization. At the same time, these workers serve as an
oxygen tank for the Mexican economy, contributing nearly US$25 billion each year
with their remittances sent to families in Mexico. Migration should be understood as
a problem that presents challenges to U.S. immigration laws, but never to its nation-
al security. This is the great difference that is sometimes forgotten.
Finally, being indispensable for the security equation means that in addition to
geographic determinism, there is a new, inevitable circle of shared interests, as well
as a set of values that historically urge us toward convergence. Consequently, and as
the twenty-first century progresses and the major regional powers of Europe and
China are consolidated, the two countries will have to abandon sovereignty-oriented
logic and open up to a truly regional focus that includes Canada. In this focus, what
is beneficial for Mexico is also useful for the United States, and vice versa —with-
out, of course, losing sight of each country’s specificities.
The possibility of Mexico and the United States becoming further distanced from
each other in the coming years seems unthinkable, in the context of new threats and
the configuration of a new international order. On the contrary, and without lapsing
into voluntarism, we can assume that we are condemned in the long run to develop
a better understanding of each other, due to the converging interests we share.
If Mexico is politically stable, it can generate the conditions for sustainable devel-
opment, which not only offers prosperity, but also well paying jobs that do not force
people to migrate. If Mexico is demographically stable, as predicted by experts for
the coming decades, this will imply fewer tensions with its neighbor, and we will have
a safer border. If Mexico benefits from infrastructure and investment, it will enhance
the region’s global competitiveness, strengthening the relative power of the United
States in the world economic context.
In the current state of affairs, the issue of security represents an opportunity to
come together in tactical and operational terms. We should clear the air of past offenses
and tactless mistakes and focus squarely on the facts. The great challenge of the com-
ing years is to move beyond tactical and operational aspects to a strategic focus that
considers security in the long term. It seems evident to me that if we consider the
panorama over the next 50 years, and we use our political will to overcome the prej-
udices each side has toward the other, U.S. security will inevitably be formulated
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